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Flame y MD5
En 2005 escribí una prueba de concepto donde usé una conocida vulnerabilidad de MD5 descubierta por Xiaoyun Wang en 20041, para engañar cualquier sistema que valide la firma digital de un archivo usando MD5. Posteriormente Peter Selinger desarrolló una mejora de mi esquema lo que permite automatizar aún más el proceso.
Mi prueba de concepto permite que dos programas distintos (uno “bueno” y otro “malvado”) tengan la misma firma MD5. Para que funcione mi esquema se requiere un tercer programa extractor. Sin embargo, Selinger mejoró mi esquema eliminando este tercer programa. En esencia lo que hace Selinger es crear un “programa esquizofrénico”, que contiene las dos personalidades del programa (la buena y la malvada).
En 2009 Didier Stevens usó el programa de Selinger para crear dos programas con la misma firma digital Authenticode, un programa usado por Microsoft para firmar digitalmente archivos.
Los mismos conceptos fueron usados por Marc Stevens, Arjen K. Lenstra y Benne de Weger para crear programas que tienen la misma firma digital, en este caso estos investigadores determinaron un conjunto de bytes que se deben agregar al final de cada archivo para lograr el efecto.
Lo interesante de todo esto es que estos esquemas han sido usados en la elaboración del temible virus conocido como Flame.
Flame aparentemente es una arma cibernética, al igual que Stuxnet, cuyo objetivo es atacar potencias extranjeras, en particular Irán y su programa atómico.
Marc Stevens investigó el código de Flame y descubrió que este usa un esquema similar a los descritos para hacer pasar su código como una actualización válida de Windows:
The first cryptographic collision attack against the cryptographic hash function MD5 was invented by Xiaoyun Wang et al. in 2004 , which however did not pose a serious immediate threat due to technical limitations. Subsequently, we have devised a more flexible collision attack against MD5 in 2007, a so-called chosen-prefix collision attack . This posed a greater threat due to the removal of the most important technical limitation. Finally, we refined our attack in 2008 and used it to construct a rogue Certification Authority, thereby demonstrating a serious vulnerability in internet security. Our demonstration convinced Microsoft and various governments to raise the security standards for Certification Authorities, by disallowing the use of MD5-based signatures effective 15 January 2009.
It is clear that Microsoft, at that time, should have also disallowed MD5-based signatures in their Terminal Server Licensing Service (TSLS). As apparently the Flame collision attack was executed in February 2010, it now turns out they did not; this has been an important oversight. The result of this collision attack on a Microsoft TSLS Certification Authority was a code-signing certificate appearing to be from Microsoft that may be used to sign Windows Updates. This attack avenue was essentially open to any knowledgeable attackers since June 2009, when, under the belief that MD5-based signatures had indeed been disallowed, we made the program sources for a chosen-prefix collision attack publicly available. Furthermore, it should be noted that, even without a collision attack, Microsoft has unsuspectingly been providing its TSLS customers with unwarranted code-signing abilities.
We have developed a forensic tool for collision attacks [7] that can efficiently detect a wide range of known and unknown collision attacks against MD5 as well as MD5's successor SHA-1. Moreover, this tool may also be used to online detect fraudulent certificates constructed using a collision attack.
Using our forensic tool, we have indeed verified that a chosen-prefix collision attack against MD5 has been used for Flame. More interestingly, the results have shown that not our published chosen-prefix collision attack was used, but an entirely new and unknown variant. Therefore it is not unreasonable to assume that the particular chosen-prefix collision attack variant underlying Flame had already been in development before June 2009. This has led to our conclusion that the design of Flame is partly based on world-class cryptanalysis. Further research will be conducted to reconstruct the entire chosen-prefix collision attack devised for Flame.
Lo que demuestra, una vez más, que no importa cuanta investigación se haga en criptografía, estos resultados no son adoptados por la industria hasta que ocurre un desastre...
“How to break MD5 and other hash functions”, Xiaoyun Wang and Hongbu Yu, EUROCRYPT 2005, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 3494, Springer, 2005, pp. 19–35. ↩︎